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ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the main determinants of a central government’s decision to 
use grants to bail out regional governments (i.e., the determinants of additional grants assigned 
by a central government to regions due to an increase in their issue of debt). The estimated grant 
equation is derived from a model of a federation, based on Goodspeed (2002), where regions are 
Stakelberg leaders and the central government’s objective is to maximize a weighted sum of the 
welfare of the representative consumers from all the regions. The specified equation is estimated 
separately with a panel data set of discretionary and non-discretionary grants for 15 Spanish 
regions during the period 1986-2001, using the within and the GMM estimators (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991), respectively. The results show that the Spanish central government uses grants to 
partially bailout regions. Such fiscal rescue operations are more intense when: i) the region is 
responsible for providing health care; ii) debt limits exist (and they have not been properly 
designed); iii) regional voters are relatively indifferent between the incumbent and the 
challenger (i.e., there is a high proportion of swing voters). 
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RESUMEN: Este trabajo analiza los determinantes de la decisión del gobierno central de 
utilizar transferencias para rescatar a los gobiernos regionales (i.e., los determinantes de las 
transferencias adicionales asignadas por el gobierno central debido a un aumento en la deuda de 
los gobiernos regionales). Las ecuaciones de transferencias estimadas se derivan de un marco 
analítico, basado en Goodspeed (2002), donde las regiones son Stakelberg líderes y el objetivo 
del gobierno central es maximizar la suma ponderada del bienestar de los consumidores 
representativos de todas las regiones. Estas ecuaciones se estiman separadamente para las 
transferencias discrecionales y las no discrecionales, con un panel de datos de las 15 
Comunidades Autónomas (CCAA) de régimen común durante el período 1986-2001, utilizando 
el estimador intragrupos y el GMM (Arellano y Bond, 1991), respectivamente. Los resultados 
muestran que el gobierno central español utiliza las transferencias para rescatar parcialmente a 
las CCAA. Dicho rescate fiscal es más intenso cuando: i) la región es responsable de proveer 
sanidad; ii) existen límites sobre la deuda (y no han sido correctamente diseñados); iii) los 
votantes regionales son indiferentes entre el partido en el gobierno y el de la oposición (i.e. 
existe una elevada proporción de votantes indecisos). 
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1. Introduction 
 
In many decentralized countries, both developed and developing, subcentral governments are 
heavily indebted. These include regional governments in countries such as Brazil, Italy and 
Spain, with those in Argentina constituting the most salient case (Rezk, 1998). This is a highly 
pressing issue, given that the lack of fiscal discipline of subcentral governments has been 
identified as a major source of macroeconomic instability (IMF, 2005). The literature has 
provided an explanation for this behaviour based on the expectations held by subcentral 
governments that they will receive additional resources from debt issues. Such expectations can, 
however, weaken the fiscal discipline of subcentral governments and induce them into adopting 
a strategic use of debt. For instance, a subcentral government with expectations of being bailed 
out might decide to use debt rather than to make use of its tax autonomy to balance its budget 
constraint, since the former option has a lower (political and economic) cost.  
 
A subcentral government is said to have a soft budget constraint when its expenditure is not 
fully covered by its revenue and it chooses to issue debt in the expectation of receiving 
additional resources from the central government (Kornai et al., 2003). This designation of 
additional resources, termed a bailout (Wildasin, 1997), is most commonly achieved by the 
assignment of additional intergovernmental grants and can be either explicit or implicit. In an 
explicit bailout, the central government provides a supplementary grant to the subcentral 
government facing financial difficulties to ensure that it can carry out its responsibilities1. Such 
bailouts may come with or without conditionalities. In an implicit bailout, the central 
government provides an additional amount from existing grants to a subcentral government 
because of its use of debt. In this paper, we focus on the existence and determinants of implicit 
bailouts. 
 
Theoretical analyses (e.g., Carlsen, 1998; Goodspeed, 2002; Inman, 2003) and the evidence 
from a number of case studies, including the USA (Inman, 2003), Canada (Bird and Tassonyi, 
2003) and Hungary (Wetzel and Papp, 2003), indicate that fiscal decentralization per se does 
not necessarily weaken the fiscal discipline of subcentral governments. The effect of fiscal 
decentralization on subcentral governments’ fiscal discipline is conditioned by the institutional 
arrangements regarding intergovernmental fiscal relations. Specifically, this effect depends on 
whether the institutional environment generates for subcentral governments expectations of 
being bailed out (Rodden et al., 2003). 
                                                 
1 The central government might also assume some of the subcentral governments’ liabilities or a share of 
their debt. 
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In the first place, to be able to implement a bailout, some discretion by the central government 
in the allocation of resources among subcentral governments is needed (Rodden, 2001; Oates, 
2005). The literature emphasises the fact that, when regional governments are responsible for 
providing a key public service, such as health care or education, it is difficult for the central 
government not to bail them out when they face financial difficulties (Rodden et al., 2003; 
Bordignon and Turatti, 2005). Likewise, an absence of subcentral fiscal autonomy (over taxes, 
expenditure or borrowing) can also induce the central government to bail regions out, since they 
lack the instruments to make a fiscal adjustment (von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996). The 
number of people living in the region can affect this decision too. According to the “too big to 
fail” hypothesis (Wildasin, 1997), the larger the population in a region is, the greater the 
probability of it being bailed out, since the negative externalities caused by the financial 
difficulties affect a higher share of the population. The political characteristics of the regions 
can also affect the central government’s bailout decision, as it is shown latter on. 
 
A number of empirical studies have examined the effects of bailouts on subcentral fiscal 
discipline2. Petterson-Libdon (2007) estimates the effect of the expectations of being bailed out 
on the fiscal discipline of Swedish municipalities for the period 1979-1992. He proxies these 
expectations by the explicit bailout grants received by neighbouring municipalities and reports 
that such an expectation increases local public debt by 20%. Bordignon and Turatti (2005) 
estimate the effect of bailout expectations, proxied by political characteristics, on regional 
public health care expenditure for the Italian regions during the period 1990-1999. They also 
find that such expectations expand this expenditure. Garcia-Milà et al. (2001) show that, for the 
period 1984-1995, the amount of additional grants expected by Spanish regions, proxied by the 
share of regions in terms of population3, generates higher levels of regional public debt. By 
contrast, Lago (2005) empirically analyses the determinants of Spanish regional deficits for the 
period 1984-1996, and concludes that they are not due to bailout expectations, but rather to the 
lack of regional financial autonomy. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on whether the central Spanish 
government uses grants to implicitly bail out regional governments during the period 1986-2001 
and, if so, to examine the determinants of such a decision. To the best of our knowledge, this 
                                                 
2 See Besfamille and Lockwood (2007) for a theoretical approach to this issue. 
 
3 They develop a model in which they consider aggregate bailouts, i.e., the central government cannot 
increase the grants allocated to one region, but rather it has to increase the grants assigned to all regions. 
These additional grants are distributed in proportion to each region’s population. Thus, expectations of 
bailout are proxied by the regions’ share of population. 
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issue has yet to be addressed empirically. Spain is a particularly well suited institutional 
environment to this study as it is experiencing an ongoing process of decentralization, gradually 
introduced over time, and characterised by significant differences across the regions. Today, 
regional public expenditure accounts for approximately 40% of overall public expenditure. 
During the period analysed there was a substantial increase in the issue of public debt by 
regional governments. And although the lion’s share of their resources comes from formula-
based grants, there is still substantial room for discretion in their distribution. Spanish regions 
have experienced considerable variation in their fiscal autonomy; and, moreover, they are 
responsible for providing basic public services, such as health care and education, having 
assumed such responsibilities at different points in time. These characteristics, in addition to 
others that are outlined in detail below, present differences across regions and in time and, thus, 
help us to identify the existence and determinants of implicit bailouts4. 
 
In this paper, we first establish a basic framework for analysing the existence and determinants 
of subcentral government bailouts based on Goodspeed (2002). This model provides an 
equation that identifies the main determinants of the distribution of grants among subcentral 
governments, including the issue of debt by subcentral governments. Secondly, this equation is 
estimated with a panel data set for the Spanish regions during the period 1986-2001. We find 
that Spanish regions are partially bailout by the central government and that the bailout is more 
prevalent when: i) the region is responsible for providing health care; ii) there are debt limits 
(and they have not been properly designed); iii) regional voters are relatively indifferent 
between the incumbent and the challenger (i.e., there is a high proportion of swing voters). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section we introduce a simple model 
of grant allocation among regions. In the third section we briefly describe the main 
characteristics of the intergovernmental relationships in Spain, identifying the reasons why the 
Spanish central government might use grants to differentially bail out regions. The data base 
and econometric procedures are also discussed in this section. The results are presented in the 
fourth section. Finally, the last section summarises the main conclusion of this analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 From hereon in we use the term bailout to refer solely to implicit bailouts since, in Spain, there is no 
grant whose specific purpose is to explicitly bailout regions in financial difficulties.  
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2. Analytical frameworks 
 
The natural way to model the bailout decision is in terms of a sequential game (Carlsen, 1998; 
Goodspeed, 2002; Inman, 2003). The central government makes a no-bailout claim. The 
subcentral governments assess the credibility of this claim and make their budgetary decisions 
accordingly. If they fail to find the central claim credible, they issue debt. In the final stage, the 
central government must decide whether or not to bail out subcentral governments. Its decision 
depends on the payoffs of each action. The benefits of refusing to provide fiscal rescue 
operations accrue in the future when the central government’s no-bailout claim becomes 
credible and subcentral governments behave responsibly. The costs of not bailing out are 
immediate, since the welfare of subcentral governments falls below a desired level and this may 
have electoral consequences for the incumbent at the centre. This temporal gap between costs 
and benefits, together with the short period of time that politicians consider when taking their 
decision, reduces the credibility of the no-bailout claim. 
 
In this paper, the basic framework for analysing the existence and determinants of regional 
governments’ bailouts is based on the two-period inter-temporal model described in Goodspeed 
(2002). We consider a federation with one central government and two regional governments, 
indexed by i=1, 2. The population of region i is Nit, with t=1, 2 indicating the period of time. 
There is perfect information. Each individual in region i consumes Cit units of a private good 
and Eit per capita units of a public good provided by the regional government. The utility of the 
representative resident of region i depends upon its consumption of public and private goods in 
both periods and it is assumed to be concave, increasing and additively separable in each of its 
arguments. Hence, the utility of the representative individual takes the form: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22112121   ,,, iiiiiiiiiiiii CvEuCvEuCCEEW ρρ +++=  [1] 
 
where ρ  is the discount factor. The representative consumer of region i is endowed with Yit 
units of income in each period. The provision of the public good is financed by a regional lump-
sum tax, Tit, and a grant provided by the central government, Git. In the first period, regions can 
issue debt, denoted by Di1, to finance the public good provision. Thus, the budget constraints in 
the first period are: 
 
 1111 iiii DTGE ++=        &         1 1 1i i iC Y T= −  [2] 
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In the second period, the regional public debt must be null. Moreover, in the second period the 
central government’s per capita grants, Gi2 , must be completely financed by a central 
government lump-sum tax on consumers, 2
CT . Thus, the budget constraints in the second period 
are: 
 
 ( ) 1222 1 iiii DrTGE +−+=  , 2 2 2 2Ci i iC Y T T= − −   &  ∑=∑
i
ii
i
C
i GNTN 2222  [3] 
 
The objective function of regional governments is the welfare of the representative consumer 
(equation [1]), while the objective function of the central government is a weighted sum of the 
welfare of the representative consumers of all regions, which can be expressed as follows: 
 
 ∑+∑=
i
ii
i
ii WWW 2211 φρφ  [4] 
 
where itφ  is the weight assigned to region i at period t. If the central government is benevolent, 
these weights will be the relative size of the region in terms of population ( ∑=
k
ktitit NNφ ). 
Nonetheless, there is theoretical (e.g. Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987) 
and empirical (e.g. Case, 2001, Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 
2007) evidence showing that the goal of the central government is to maximize not only social 
welfare, but also its own welfare, thereby ensuring its maintenance in power. Thus, itφ  can also 
take into consideration the political characteristics of the regions.  
 
The timing of the game is as follows. Before the game starts, central government decides the 
distribution of grants for period one between regions, 11G  and 21G . Regional governments are 
Stackelberg leaders and, in the first period, simultaneously determine their taxes, 1iT , and 
borrowing, 1iD . Each regional government takes the other regional government’s choice as 
given. In the second period, central and regional governments move simultaneously. The former 
chooses the regions’ level of grants for the second period, 12G and 22G , to maximize W subject 
to budget constraints (equations [2] and [3]), taken as given 1iT  and 1iD . Regional governments 
decide their taxes, 2iT , and as there is perfect information, they take into account the reaction 
function of the central government, *2iG , when deciding their debt level in the first period. 
Hence, regional government i chooses 1iT , 2iT  and 1iD  to maximize iW  subject to the budget 
constraints (equations [2] and [3]) and the reaction function of the central government, 
6
( )rGi +1*2 . To solve the game by backward induction, the central government’s problem is 
solved first5.  
 
Central government bailout decision. The first order conditions of the central government’s 
problem are: 
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where 2' iii Euu ∂∂= and 2' iii Cvv ∂∂= . 
 
Equation [5] means that the optimal distribution of grants should equate, for the two regions, the 
weighted marginal utility of increased grants to a region to the weighted marginal cost of 
increased taxes that must be paid by all regions. These weights depend on the weight that the 
central government assigns to the regions, 2iφ , and, in the case of the marginal cost, they also 
depend on the relative size of the region in terms of population, ∑
k
ki NN 22 6. Assuming an 
interior solution, the first order conditions simplify to: 
 
 '' 22 jjii uu φφ =  [6] 
 
Equation [6] states that, given the cost of funding grants, the centre’s grants should equate the 
weighted marginal utility of the regions’ consumers. This equation can be used to define *2iG  as 
an implicit function of 1iD , i.e., the central government’s reaction functions. Moreover, 
applying the implicit function theorem to equation [6], we obtain the following central 
government responses, which tell us how the regions borrowing decision in the first period 
affects the allocation of grants in the second period: 
                                                 
5 For purpose of exposition, we do not show the solution of the problem that characterizes the regional 
governments’ budgetary decision given that it analyses the effects of bailout expectations on the fiscal 
discipline of regional governments, and this lies outside the scope of this paper. 
 
6 Ceteris paribus, the larger the region that receives the additional grants, the higher the cost in terms of 
additional central taxes. If grants are financed by a proportional tax on income, the marginal cost will be 
weighted by 2iφ  and by the relative size of the region in terms of income and population. Thus, the 
weight of the marginal cost depends on the way in which grants are financed. 
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The central government uses grants to bail out a regional government if 1
*
2 ii DG ∂∂ >0, i.e., if 
the central government assigns additional grants to a region due to its issue of debt. A bailout 
cannot be undertaken if grants are completely non-discretionary, debt is not one of their 
distribution criteria and none of the distribution criteria correlate with debt7. In such a scenario, 
1
*
2 ii DG ∂∂ =0. Thus, theoretically, the existence of bailouts is conditioned to the type of 
grants8. Under this model, whenever the central government can manipulate the distribution of 
grants, it will bail out regional governments, i.e., the sign of this derivative (equation [7]) is 
always positive, since the utility function is assumed to be concave in its arguments ( )0'' <iu . 
Moreover, rDG ii +≤∂∂ 11*2  since ≥Γi 0, i.e., the central government will partially or totally 
bail out regional governments. 
 
This derivative shows that the decision to bail out a region depends on how additional grants 
affect the welfare of all the regions’ consumers, weighted by the relative size of the regions in 
terms of population and by the weight that the central government assigns to each region. The 
higher the weighted relative marginal impact that those additional grants generate to the region 
to which they are assigned (i.e., lower Γ ), the greater the magnitude of the bailout will be. In 
the extreme case where 0→Γ , the central government will completely bail out the regional 
government (i.e. rDG ii +=∂∂ 11*2 ). 
                                                 
7 For instance, in an equalization grant where Income is one of the distribution criteria (the higher the 
income of the region, the lower the grant it is assigned) and, if Income positively correlates with Debt 
(cov(Income,Debt)>0), a bailout can be implemented reducing the weight of Income in the formula that 
determines the distribution of this grant. 
 
8 There is, however, empirical evidence that shows that in some cases politicians can manipulate the 
distribution of grants that are, in principle, formula based (e.g. Khemani, 2003). Such manipulation 
generally takes place during the bargaining stage among politicians, when the variables to be considered 
in the formula and their weight are determined. 
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The impact that these bailouts have on consumer welfare depends on the characteristics of the 
public goods provided by regional governments9, Ei, and on their level of provision10. The effect 
on welfare is weighted, on the one hand, by the weight that the central government assigns to 
regions in its utility function, itφ . The higher the relative weight assigned to a region, the 
greater the magnitude of its bailout will be. On the other hand, the welfare effect is also 
weighted by the relative size of the regions in terms of population, Nit. This characteristic is also 
considered in itφ  and as such can have two opposite effects on the decision as to whether to bail 
out a region. Due to the central government’s budget constraint, the larger the region to be 
bailed out, the greater the impact this action will have on the welfare of the other region. By 
contrast, the larger the region, the greater will be the weight assigned to it by the central 
government. Hence, the net effect of the size of the region on the decision to bail it out or not is 
ambiguous11. 
 
Testable predictions. Thus, the testable predictions derived from this analytical framework are 
the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The central government uses grants to bail out a regional government if it 
assigns additional grants to a region due to its issue of debt. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The decision to bail out a region is conditioned by the type of grants. In 
principle, it is more difficult to use non-discretionary grants to bail out regions. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The decision to bail out a region does not only depend on its issue of debt, but 
also on the characteristics of the public goods that the regional government provides, on the size 
of the region in terms of population and on the weight that the central government assigns to 
each region. 
 
                                                 
9 For instance, as we will argue in section four, the impact of these additional grants is expected to be 
higher when they are devoted to the financing of basic public goods, such as health. 
 
10 Since the utility function is assumed to be concave, we expect higher values for low levels of provision 
of the public good, E.  
 
11 In fact, Wildasin (1997) shows that the probability of a region being bailed out increases with its size 
(too big to fail). However, there is also evidence that the probability of being bailed out decreases with 
the size of the region (too small to fail). An example is the bailout provided to two German Länder (von 
Hagen et al., 2000). 
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In relation to Hypothesis 3, there are clearly other characteristics of the intergovernmental 
relationships not considered in this simple analytical framework that can induce the central 
government to bail out regions. These characteristics are country specific. In section 3.3, we 
identify the characteristics that can induce Spain’s central government to use grants to bail out 
regions. 
 
 
3. Empirical implementation 
 
3.1. Econometric specification 
 
From the reaction function of the central government, considering the most basic setting in 
which the central government is benevolent, and all the regions are identical (in terms of their 
characteristics and the utility of the representative consumer), we can express the following 
basic equation in order to estimate whether the central government uses grants to bail out 
regions:  
 
 itti
c
c
itcitit uFFXDG +++∑+= − αβ 1  [8] 
 
where itG  are the intergovernmental grants that region i receives in period t; 1−itD  is the public 
debt of region i in period t-1; citX  are the C control variables picking up the main structural 
aspects of region i that affect the long-run desired level of grants and its political characteristics; 
Fi and Ft are fixed region and time effects, respectively, which pick up structural and temporal 
characteristics that affect the distribution of grants that are not included in the control variables; 
and, uit is the error term, with zero mean and constant variance. The estimated value of β  (i.e. 
1−∂∂ itit DG ) determines the existence of bailouts, that is, whether grants are used to bail out 
regions.  
 
Relaxing the previous assumptions and considering regions to be different and the central 
government not to be fully benevolent, from its reaction function we can specify the following 
equation to identify the determinants of bailouts: 
 
 itti
c
c
itcit
J
j
itjit uFFXDYG +++∑+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∑+= − αββ 11  [9] 
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where jitY  are the J variables that summarize the potential economic and political motives of 
bailouts. If kβˆ  is positive and statistically significant from zero, we can claim that the 
characteristic captured by kY  induces the central government to use grants to bail out regions. 
Note that this expression allows a given characteristic of the regional government to have a 
different effect on the general decision of the central government on how to distribute grants 
and on its decision to use grants to bail out regions. For instance, let’s consider that some 
regions are responsible for providing a key public service such as health care, a characteristic 
captured by a dummy variable Hit equal to 1 if the region is responsible for providing health 
care during period t and 0 otherwise. The whole effect of this characteristic on the distribution 
of grants is captured by the following expression: 
 
 HitH
it
it D
H
G αβ ˆˆ +=∂
∂
 [10] 
 
where Hαˆ  measures the estimated effect of being responsible for providing health care on the 
general decision of the central government on how to distribution grants and Hβˆ  is the 
estimated effect on its decision to use grants to bail out regions. 
 
3.2. Fiscal Federalism in Spain 
 
Fiscal decentralization. Spain’s decentralization process started in 1978 with the passing of the 
Constitution whereby seventeen regional governments, the Autonomous Communities (AC), 
were created. For historical reasons, two types of regions exist: the foral communities of 
Navarra and the Basque Country, and the rest (common regime AC). Given the great differences 
in their financing system, we only consider the 15 common regime regions in our analysis here. 
Since their creation, not all these regions have been responsible for providing the same public 
goods and services. Indeed, one of the main differences between them, until 2002, was that not 
all of the regions had responsibility for the provision of health care and education, with 
responsibility for expenditure in these areas being assigned to them at different points in time. In 
1983 the revenue from some taxes was first ceded to regional governments, but the sum was 
insufficient to cover all their expenditure needs, which continued to be financed primarily by 
grants from the central government. Since 1986, the regional system of finance has been 
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negotiated and modified every five years12, with the aim of increasing the fiscal autonomy of the 
regions. Moreover, in 1992 the Spanish central government passed a law (Escenarios de 
Consolidación Presupuestaria, ECP) limiting central and regional borrowing ability, in order to 
fulfil the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty13. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Grants. As can be seen in Table 1, during the period analysed (1986-2001), intergovernmental 
grants have been the main source of revenue for the Spanish regions. They provided, on 
average, around 70% of total regional resources. Of these, some were completely discretionary 
(18%), in the main capital grants, while the greatest share of grants was non-discretionary 
(82%). The PIE (Participacion en los Ingresos del Estado, share of state revenues) was the 
main grant (44%) and it is, a priori, non-discretionary, since its distribution is formula based. 
The amount of resources that an AC receives from PIE is determined by applying its formula 
only for the first year of the financing system. In the other years, each AC receives the monies 
corresponding to the first year assessment, but the revenue level is up-dated on the basis of a 
common index. However, there is still some room for discretion in the assignment of this grant, 
particularly given that the formula can be modified every five years when the regions 
renegotiate their financing system. In fact, this formula is the result of a political negotiation. In 
addition to this formula, there are a number of rules and financial guarantees that determine its 
distribution. These additional rules have no economic justification and cause that the final 
distribution of this grant is far away from the result obtained when applying the formula only. 
Thus, taken together these two traits provide a certain degree of discretion. 
 
The second most important grant in quantitative terms is that devoted to financing the regional 
provision of health care. It is also, a priori, non-discretionary since it is determined on a formula 
basis, but not one applied yearly. However, here also there is room for discretion during the 
bargaining of the system. Moreover, until 1994 the implementation of the health financing 
                                                 
12 During the period analysed there have been three different financing systems operating between 1987-
1991, 1992-1996 and 1997-2001, respectively. 
 
13 See Lago (2005) and Bosch and Duran (2007) for a broad description of the financing system operated 
by the Spanish regions. 
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system was based on bilateral agreements between the regions and the central government, 
which introduced an additional element of discretion in its distribution14.  
 
Regional public debt. As the figures in the last row of Table 1 show, the issue of debt by 
regional governments has increased substantially, especially since 1992, when the ECP 
established the limits on debt. 
 
Political environment. In central and regional elections, the electoral districts are the provinces. 
The number of representatives elected in each province depends on its population size, and the 
d’Hondt formula with a threshold is used to translate votes into representatives. As such, the 
system is not entirely proportional and, in practice, it is much easier to win a seat in certain 
provinces (rural areas) than in others. In Spain, central and regional elections are usually held at 
regular four-year intervals, although they can be called before the end of the term-of-office. 
During the period analysed (1986-2001), five central and five regional15 elections have been 
held. The incumbent at the centre has been left-wing (PSOE) during the first ten years, and 
right-wing (PP) during the last six years16. Among the regions, the incumbent has always been 
left-wing in just three and always right-wing in just two. In other words, during the period 
analysed there have been significant variations in the political characteristics of both central and 
regional governments. 
 
3.3. Sample, variables and data source 
 
In this section we enumerate the potential bailout determinants and the variables used here to 
proxy them, as well as the other variables used in this empirical analysis. A summary of the 
definitions of these variables and the data sources used can be found in the Appendix. The 
model’s predictions regarding the existence and the determinants of bailout grants are tested 
using data for the 15 common regime Spanish regions for the period 1986-2001. 
 
 
                                                 
14 During the period analysed there have been two health financing systems, covering the periods 1994-
1997 and 1998-2001, respectively. Since 2002, all the regions have had responsibility for providing health 
care and its financing system has been incorporated within the general system. 
 
15 Central elections took place in 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996 and 2000. Regional elections are not held 
simultaneously in all regions. See Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2007) for a broader description of 
Spain’s electoral system and political parties. 
 
16 PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español; PP Partido Popular. PSOE is recognised as being a left-
wing party and PP as right-wing.  
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Determinants of bailouts  
 
Types of intergovernmental grants. As highlighted earlier, the existence of bailouts is 
conditioned by the types of grant in use. If the distribution of grants is discretionary, central 
government can use them to bail out regional governments. By contrast, if grants are non-
discretionary, the central government has little or no discretion in providing additional grants 
due to regional debt (Rodden, 2001). However, the existence of distribution rules can have the 
opposite effect and help strengthen the possibility of bailouts. Equalization grants, for example, 
depending on how they are defined, can result in the central government bailing out regional 
governments in financial difficulties (Seitz, 2000). Moreover, there is evidence that in some 
cases politicians can manipulate the distribution of grants that are, in principle, formula based 
(Khemani, 2003). 
 
To test whether the type of grant conditions its probability of being used to bail out regional 
governments, the total transfers assigned by central government to the regional governments are 
broken down into Non-Discretionary Grantsit and Discretionary Grantsit depending on whether 
or not they are formula based.  
 
Assignment of expenditure responsibilities. The decision as to whether to bail out a region is 
dependent also on the public goods and services provided by that regional government. If a 
regional government is responsible for providing key public goods or services, such as health 
care, it is especially difficult for the central government to refuse to bail it out when that region 
can no longer provide such services. This is particularly true in those cases in which the regional 
government has little fiscal autonomy, i.e., a low adjustment capacity. It is also true when the 
central government has established a minimum or standard provision level on those public 
services that are the responsibility of regional governments (Rodden et al., 2003; Bordignon and 
Turatti, 2005).  
 
The provision of public goods and services often generates positive externalities to other 
regions. If a regional government cannot provide the optimal level of these services, the central 
government will tend to bail it out since any reduction in the provision of these services affects 
not only the utility of the representative consumer of this region, but also the representative 
consumers of other regions (Wildasin, 1997). The incentives for the central government to bail 
out a region increase with the size of these positive externalities, confirming the “too big to fail” 
hypothesis. 
 
14
To test the effect of these characteristics empirically, the differences in the expenditure 
responsibilities assigned to regions are proxied by a dummy variable, Health Care 
Responsibilityit, which is equal to one if region i is responsible for providing health care in year t 
and zero otherwise. Provision of health care is considered a key service by the Spanish central 
government, which fixes the minimum standard expected. Following Wildasin (1997), the 
externalities generated by the public goods and services provided by regional governments are 
proxied by the size of the regions in terms of population, Population Shareit. As we have seen in 
the analytical framework, this variable also proxies one of the characteristics that can determine 
the weight that the central government assigns to each region in its objective function, and its 
expected sign can be either positive or negative. 
 
Degree of borrowing autonomy. Many countries impose borrowing restrictions on regional 
governments17 in order to avoid regional fiscal problems and, hence, the need for bailouts. The 
success of these restrictions depends on the regional governments’ ability to circumvent them 
(Milesi-Ferretti, 2000) and on their credibility (Mikesell, 2002). If they are not effective, these 
limits can have the opposite effect. If complying with them is important for the central 
government, their establishment can result in the central government bailing out regions that 
exceed them. 
 
To test the effect on the central government’s reaction function of the limits on debt established 
in 1992, we define a temporal dummy Limits on Debtt, which is equal to one during the period 
1992-2001, and is equal to zero otherwise. 
 
Political benefits. The decision to use grants to bail out a region can also be determined by 
political reasons, since, as we have argued in the analytical framework, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the weights that the central government assigns to the regions in its objective 
function, itφ , depend on their political characteristics. A growing number of empirical studies 
have recently analysed the influence of political factors on the distribution of grants. This 
literature identifies political alignment, electoral productivity and partisanship as the main 
determinants of the distribution of grants. Thus, recent papers claim that the party in central 
government assigns more grants to politically-aligned regions (i.e., regions that are ruled by the 
same party as the one in central government), since in this case, all the political credit (i.e., 
votes) derived from the grants is fully captured by the party (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 
                                                 
17 These restrictions can take many forms, such as balanced budget constraints or restrictions on the 
ability to issue debt. See Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997) for a summary. 
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2007; Arulampalam et al., 2008). Some papers suggest that parties will allocate more resources 
in regions where the marginal gains to be obtained are higher, that is, in regions where a high 
share of voters have been shown to be relatively indifferent to the incumbent and the challenger 
(i.e., regions with a high proportion of “swing voters”) (e.g. Case, 2001; Dahlberg and 
Johansson, 2002; Johansson, 2003). Some of these papers have sought to contrast this 
hypothesis with an alternative theory that claims that, if politicians are risk averse, more grants 
will be allocated to those jurisdictions in which voters are clearly attached to the incumbent 
party (i.e. regions with a high proportion of “core supporters”) (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; 
Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005). 
 
To test whether these political characteristics affect the decision of the central government to 
use grants to bail out regional governments, we define the following variables. To test the effect 
of political alignment, we define two variables: on the one hand, a dummy variable, Alignedit, 
that is equal to one when either the single-party or the leader of the coalition in the regional 
government is the same party as that in the central government (also a single party or coalition 
leader); and, on the other, we define a dummy variable, Pivotalit, that is equal to one when a 
party that is a partner in the coalition in the central government is the same as the single party or 
the leader of the coalition at the regional level. This variable captures the regions that are ruled 
by a party that is also a member of the central government and that is needed to form the central 
government (see Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2007 for a discussion of the definition of the 
alignment status). To test the effect of electoral productivity, we define a dummy variable, 
Swingit, that is equal to one when the party in the central government obtained more than 35% 
of the votes in region i at the general elections held prior to t and its electoral margin is lower 
than 10 perceptual points. Since Spain does not have a two-party system, we measure the 
electoral margin as the difference (in absolute value) between the vote share of the party in 
government and the vote share of the next party, with either more or fewer votes (Johnston et 
al., 1999). To test the effect of partisanship, we define a dummy variable, Coreit, that is equal to 
one when the party in the central government obtained more than 40% of the votes with an 
electoral margin greater than 10 at the previous general elections18. The swing regions can be 
aligned or unaligned, but the core regions are always aligned. Thus, the Aligned and Core 
variables are highly correlated and the excluded category is the Non-aligned regions. 
 
                                                 
18 As the definitions of Swing and Core regions are somewhat arbitrary, as a robustness check in the 
empirical analysis we have defined these variables employing different limits for the share of votes and 
the electoral margin. 
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Regional Public Debt The public debt of regional governments, Debtit, is the debt defined in the 
Protocol on the Excessive Deficit of the European Union19. As discussed above, the financing 
system of the Spanish regions is renegotiated every five years. To determine whether the central 
government’s decision to bail out a region is different when the financing system is being 
negotiated, we decompose the stock of public debt at period t as follows. We define the Initial 
Debtit as the public debt that a region i has when the financing system of year t is negotiated; 
and, the Accumulated Debtit as the increase in the stock of debt since that time. If the estimated 
coefficients of both variables are positive and statistically significant, we can conclude that the 
central government’s decision to bail out regions depends on the stock of debt observed at every 
period. By contrast, if only the estimated coefficient of Initial Debtit is statistically significant, 
then the decision of the central government is only determined by the stock of debt existing 
when the financing system is being negotiated.  
 
In order to consider the effect of the negotiation of the health care financing system, for those 
regions with responsibility for providing health care, we decompose the Accumulated Debt into 
the accumulated debt until the health care financing system comes under negotiation and the 
remainder20. If the estimated coefficient of the Initial Debt and the Accumulated Debt when 
negotiating the health care financing system are positive and statistically significant, we can 
conclude that the central government’s decision to bail out regions depends on the stock of debt 
observed when the general financing system is being negotiated and, for those regions that are 
responsible for providing health care, it also depends on the accumulated debt up until the time 
when the health financing system is being negotiated. 
 
Control variables. Apart from the issue of debt, several structural aspects of the regions might 
determine the distribution of grants. These structural aspects are mainly related to the 
expenditure needs and the fiscal capacity of regions. The expenditure needs are proxied by the 
Populationit of the region (Solé, 1999) and by an index, Expenditure Responsibilitiesit, which 
considers the differences in the expenditure responsibility assigned to regions. Specifically, this 
index quantifies the increase in regional expenditure needs due to the assignment of the 
provision of health and/or education. During the period analysed, Spanish regions mainly had 
taxes levied on wealth. There were no significant differences in their tax autonomy. Thus, their 
fiscal capacity is proxied by their gross domestic product, Incomeit (Esteller et al., 2005). We 
                                                 
19 This includes the long- and short-run debt of the regional public authorities, but it does not consider 
that of all public firms and organisms. Optimally, we should also consider the debt of the latter bodies, 
since many regions have used them to externalise public debt. Nonetheless, this data are not available. 
 
20 See the Appendix for a detailed definition of these variables.  
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also control for the region’s rate of unemployment observed in the previous period, 
Unemploymentit-1, in order to be sure that these additional grants are assigned because of its 
level of debt and not because of a downturn in the economy. In addition to these structural 
aspects, as the literature suggests, we also consider the political variables (Alignedit, Pivotalit, 
Swingit, and Coreit) as control variables in accounting for the tactical distribution of grants.  
 
All the monetary variables are expressed at constant 2001 prices and in per capita terms in order 
to standardize by region size. Note that all these control variables are included in the regressions 
without any interaction with debt (these are the variables included in citX  in equation [8]). 
 
3.4. Econometric issues 
 
We start the empirical analysis focusing on Discretionary Grants, since both the analytical 
framework and case studies conducted to date suggest that such grants are the ones mainly used 
to bail out regions21. 
 
We also analyse Non-Discretionary Grants, since, as discussed above, in the Spanish case, their 
distribution criteria and the bargaining process allow some room for discretion. In this case, a 
lag of the grants is introduced as an explanatory variable in the equations, since as explained 
earlier, the greatest grant (PIE) is calculated using a formula just once every five years. Thus, 
within a financing system, the amount of PIE that a region receives can be expected to be highly 
dependent on how much that region received in the previous year22. This being the case, their 
estimation by OLS would be biased since the number of temporal observations in the panel is 
small (Nickell, 1981). In order to obtain unbiased estimators, we estimate these equations by the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Two assumptions are crucial to guarantee the 
consistency of GMM estimators: the variables cannot be correlated with the error term and, 
there must be no serial correlation in the error term. To fulfil the first assumption, we express 
                                                 
21 We have estimated both a fixed and a random effects version of the model. However, the hypothesis of 
no correlation between the fixed effects and the variables included in the regression is rejected, i.e. the 
Hausman test is overcome, and the utilisation of a random coefficients model is rejected. For this reason, 
we report the results of the within estimator. 
 
22 We have checked the convenience of introducing a lag of the dependent variable when analyzing 
Discretionary Grants, but it was not significant. This result is quite rational, since Discretionary Grants 
are mainly devoted to the financing of public investment and this presents a volatile behaviour over time. 
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the variables in first differences and use as instruments lagged values of variables in levels23 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions to check for the 
validity of the set of instruments is included. To check the hypothesis of no serial correlation in 
uit, two tests of serial correlation are provided. If the error term in the levels equation was 
uncorrelated, then the first difference of the error term would show negative first-order 
autocorrelation. Thus, it is expected to find first-order serial correlation in the residuals but no 
second-order serial correlation24. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 record the results for the estimation of the central government’s reaction function 
in the case of discretionary grants and Tables 4 and 5 in the case of non-discretionary grants. 
Tables 2 and 4 show the results that correspond to the estimation of the basic equation, which 
determines whether the central government uses grants to bail out regional governments 
(equation [8]). Tables 3 and 5 report the results of the estimation of the extended equation, 
which takes into account the economic and political factors that can influence the decision of 
the central government to bail a region out (equation [9]). Table 6 shows whether the central 
government reacts differently to the stock of regional public debt when the financing system is 
being negotiated. At the bottom of the tables, we show the results of a battery of specification 
statistics. In all cases, all the variables are jointly significant and the time effects are also 
significant. 
 
Discretionary grants We begin by discussing the basic characteristics of the central 
government’s reaction function in the case of discretionary grants (equation [8]). The results 
reported in Table 2 show that the central government’s distribution of discretionary grants 
positively depends on the issue of debt by regional governments (i.e. 1−∂∂ itit DDG >0 and 
statistically significant). Thus, the initial conclusion to be drawn is that Spain’s central 
government uses discretionary grants to bail out regional governments. If a region increases its 
debt by 100€ per capita, the central government will, on average, assign to this region an 
                                                 
23 Among the possible transformations, we have chosen that of the first differences because it guarantees 
that GMM estimators are consistent even when the instruments are not strictly exogenous (Lahiri, 1993). 
We use two lagged values of the variables in levels as instruments. 
 
24 Although in the presence of heteroscedasticity it is more efficient to use the two-steps GMM procedure, 
given the characteristic of our sample (small n and t), its standard errors can be a poor guide for 
hypothesis testing (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Thus, we use the one-step GMM estimator. 
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additional discretionary grant of 1.9 € per capita. Hence, the Spanish central government 
partially bails regional governments out. The serial correlation tests show that there is no 
autocorrelation.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
If we examine the control variables, the results show that more discretionary grants are assigned 
to richer regions. Expenditure needs and the rate of unemployment do not play any role in the 
allocation of discretionary grants. There is, however, evidence of tactical distribution in the 
assignment of these grants. More discretionary grants are assigned to swing, aligned and pivotal 
regions. For instance, on average, a swing region will received 7.92 € per capita more, in terms 
of discretionary grants, than a non-swing region. This difference increases to 11.77 € per capita 
if it is a swing and aligned region. Among the aligned regions, the central government assigns 
substantially more discretionary grants to those that are pivotal (3.85 € vs. 11.12 € per capita). 
There is no evidence that the central government assigns more resources to the core regions. 
Thus, we observe that the distribution of these resources seeks to maximize their electoral 
productivity. As a robustness check of these results, due to the high correlation between the 
Aligned and Core variables, we have run the regression considering them together and 
separately. We have also run these regressions with alternative definitions of the Core and 
Swing regions (i.e., establishing different limits on the share of votes and the electoral margin) 
but did not obtain significantly different results. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Having determined that Spain’s central government does use discretionary grants to partially 
bail out regional governments, we now move on to analyse the economic and political reasons 
underlying this decision. As the results in Table 3 show, swing regions receive a higher 
additional discretionary grant than that received by non-swing regions, independently of their 
alignment status. On average, if a swing region increases its debt by 100 €, the central 
government will assign to this region an additional discretionary grant of 4.2 € (compared to 1.6 
€ if it is a non-swing region). Thus, being a swing region is a characteristic that not only affects 
the decision of the central government to use discretionary grants to bail out regions, but also its 
general decision on how to distribute these grants. 
 
There is no evidence that any of the economic characteristics of the institutional setting 
identified here as potential factors that might lead the central government to bail out a region 
actually affect this decision. Thus, a region’s having responsibility for the provision of health 
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care, the size of the region in terms of population, and the existence of limits on the issue of 
debt do not affect the decision of the central government to use grants to bail out regions. 
 
Non-discretionary grants. In the case of the central government’s reaction function when non-
discretionary grants are considered, Table 4 shows that their distribution also depends on the 
regional governments’ issue of debt. Specifically, if a region increases its debt by 100 €, the 
central government will assign to this region an additional non-discretionary grant of 7.7 € in 
the following period, and one of 13.18 € in the long run25. Thus, although theoretically it has 
been argued that non-discretionary grants are rarely used to bail out regional governments, there 
is evidence that Spain’s central government does use non-discretionary grants for that specific 
purpose. As discussed above, the most quantitatively important non-discretionary grants are PIE 
and Health Care Grants and their distribution criteria allow certain room for discretion. A 
further finding is that the distribution of non-discretionary grants in period t positively depends 
on their distribution in period t-1. This result corroborates the convenience of incorporating 
dynamics in the analysis. As can be seen at the bottom of Table 5, the serial correlation tests 
show that there is first-order serial correlation (AR(1)) in the first-differenced residuals but no 
second-order correlation (AR (2)). The Sargan tests confirm the validity of the instruments used. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
If we examine the control variables, apart from the lag of grants, the differences in the 
responsibilities assigned to regions regarding expenditure positively determine their distribution. 
The non significance of the other economic control variables capturing expenditure needs and 
fiscal capacity can be explained by the fact that their impact on the distribution of grants is 
already picked up by the lagged value of the endogenous variable. The rate of unemployment 
does not affect the distribution of non-discretionary grants. Among the political control 
variables, only the fact of being a swing region positively affects the amount of non-
discretionary grants assigned by the central government. As Khemani (2003) claims, formula-
based grants are less sensitive to political interests. However, here, this result may also be due to 
the characteristics of the political variables. They are measured only when an election is held, 
and they are constant until the next election. Since they are expressed in first differences, they 
are zero for all the years in which an election is not held. Therefore, the source of variation in 
                                                 
25 β  is the reaction of the central government in the short run, while ( )θβ −1  is its reaction in the long 
run, where θ  is the coefficient associated to 1−itNDG . 
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these variables may not suffice to identify their effect on the distribution of non-discretionary 
grants. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
Regarding the economic and political determinants of the central government’s decision to use 
non-discretionary grants to bail out regions, the following conclusions should be highlighted 
(Table 5). First, differences in the responsibilities assigned to regions regarding expenditure 
affect the central government’s decision to bail out regional governments. Specifically, 
responsibility for health care provision leads the central government to bail out regional 
governments. If a region increases its debt by 100 €, the central government will, on average, 
assign to this region an additional non-discretionary grant of 34.00 € in the following year if this 
region is responsible for providing health care (as opposed to just 4.9 € if it is not). This result 
can be explained by the fact that the central government considers health a key service and it 
regulates its minimum level of service provision. As not all regions are responsible for 
providing education, we have also tested this effect. The results claim that the assignment of the 
provision of education to regional governments does not affect the central government’s 
reaction function. A feasible explanation for this might be that the central government considers 
health a more essential service than education. Another explanation is that expenditure in health 
care is highly expansive (due to technological changes and the aging of the population) and, 
thus, it is difficult to control. 
 
Second, the establishment of limits on the borrowing autonomy of regional governments affects 
the decision whether or not to bail out a regional government. Specifically, the limits introduced 
in 1992 induce the central government to distribute non-discretionary grants in order to bail out 
regions. On average, after the establishment of those limits, if a region increases its debt by 100 
€, the central government will assign to this region an additional non-discretionary grant of 21.4 
€ in the following year (as opposed to 4.9 € before their establishment). It is not possible from 
these results, therefore, to conclude that the limits introduced were effective. In fact, as 
discussed earlier, regional debt has increased substantially since these limits were introduced. 
This set of circumstances can be explained by the design of these limits, which did not include 
any penalty in case of non-compliance. Moreover, for the central government it was important 
to meet these criteria, in order to fulfil the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. These two 
facts served to undermine their overall credibility.  
 
Third, as in the case of discretionary grants, swing regions receive a higher bailout than that 
received by non-swing regions. On average, if a swing region increases its debt by 100 €, the 
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central government will assign to this region an additional non-discretionary grant of 13.6 € (as 
opposed to just 4.9 € for a non-swing region). These results are robust to broader and narrower 
definitions of both swing and core regions. 
 
Thus the decision of the central government to use non-discretionary grants to bail out regions is 
determined by economic and political reasons. Moreover, the magnitude of the bailout can be 
significant. For instance, following the establishment of limits on the use of debt, a swing region 
with responsibility for health care provision that increases its debt by 100 € in a one-year period 
will receive 59.2 € of additional non-discretionary grants in the following year. Thus, more than 
half of its increase in debt will be covered by additional resources coming from the central 
government. 
 
Regional Public Debt. An analysis of the stock of debt that determines the reaction of the 
central government (Table 6) shows that for both types of grant, discretionary and non-
discretionary, only the debt in existence when the general financing system is being negotiated 
is of any importance. The distribution of grants reacts to the stock of regional public debt 
observed when the general financing system is being negotiated, but not to the variation in this 
stock throughout the period in which the system has been applied. In the case of the regions that 
are responsible for providing health care, the central government also reacts to the debt that 
exists when the health care financing system is being negotiated. This holds for discretionary 
and non discretionary grants. As the results in Table 6 show, if a region increases its debt by 100 
€ in the year that the general financing system is being negotiated, the central government will 
assign this region an additional discretionary grant of 2.3 € for each year that this system has 
applied, independently of the evolution in its regional public debt. If this region is responsible 
for providing health care, and if its stock of debt increases by 100 € in the period between the 
approval of the general financing and the negotiation of the health care financing system, then 
the central government will assign this region an additional discretionary grant of 4.7 € 
(2.3+2.4). 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
In the case of non-discretionary grants, these results are due in all probability to the inability of 
the central government to modify the distribution of such grants significantly, except when the 
general or health care financing systems are being negotiated. By contrast, in the case of 
discretionary grants, these results may reflect the fact that the reaction of the central government 
is not linear to the stock of regional public debt. Additionally, it might also be the case that the 
central government is more sensitive to the use of public regional debt when the financing 
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system is under negotiation. In other words, the distribution of discretionary grants can be used 
to convince some regions to approve the new financing system. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has analysed the main determinants of a central government’s decision to use grants 
to bail out its regional governments, i.e., the determinants of additional grants assigned by a 
central government to its regions owing to an increase in their issue of debt. The grant equation 
is derived from a simple two-period, inter-temporal model in which the regions are Stakelberg 
leaders and the central government’s objective is to maximize a weighted sum of the welfare of 
the representative consumers from all the regions. The weights assigned to the regions depend 
on their size, in terms of population, and on their political characteristics, since the goal of the 
central government is to maximize not only the general social welfare, but also its own welfare 
by ensuring its maintenance in power. The grant equation has been estimated using data for the 
15 Spanish common regime regions during the period 1986-2001. This equation has been 
estimated separately for discretionary grants and non-discretionary grants, since both theoretical 
and case studies indicate that the former are the transfers used primarily to bail out regions. 
 
The results show that Spain’s central government does use grants to partially bail out regions. 
This conclusion holds for both discretionary and non-discretionary grants. Specifically, if a 
region increases its issue of debt by 100 €, in the following period the central government will 
assign to it, on average, an additional discretionary grant of 1.9 € and an additional non-
discretionary grant of 7.7 € (13.18 € in the long run). Thus, although the distribution of the non-
discretionary grants is mainly formula based, there is still some room for discretion in their 
assignment. 
 
In the case of discretionary grants, swing regions receive a higher amount from these grants 
because of their issue of debt. If a swing region increases its debt by 100 €, the central 
government will assign to this region, on average, an additional discretionary grant of 4.2 € 
(compared to just 1.6 € for a non-swing region). This indicates that a proportion of these 
discretionary bailout grants seeks to maximize their electoral productivity. 
 
There is evidence of both economic and political motives underlying the central government’s 
decision to use non-discretionary grants to bail out regions. First and foremost, central 
government uses non-discretionary grants to bail out those regions that have responsibility for 
the provision of health care. The Spanish central government considers heath care a key service 
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and it regulates a minimum level of service provision. Moreover, it is a particularly highly 
expansive spending category. This finding is consistent with the explicit bail out provided by 
the central government to the regions, in 2006, to guarantee the funding of the healthcare 
system. Second, the establishment of limits on the borrowing autonomy of the regions induces 
the central government to use non-discretionary grants to bail out regions. These limits, 
introduced in 1992 in compliance with the Maastricht Treaty, have led the central government 
to bail out regions, because of the importance of meeting these criteria. This finding highlights 
the importance of the design of such borrowing limits on the issue of debt. Third, as in the case 
of discretionary grants, swing regions receive higher bailouts than those received by non-swing 
regions. The size of bailouts can be considerable and differ significantly among the regions. For 
instance, after the introduction of the debt limits, if a region increases its use of debt by 100 €, it 
will receive an additional non-discretionary grant of 21.4 €, an amount that increases to 50.5 € if 
the region is responsible for providing health care and to 59.2 € if it is also a swing region. 
 
This study has also shown that the distribution of grants by the central government only reacts 
to the existing stock of regional public debt when the general financing system is under 
negotiation. In the case of regions that are responsible for providing health care, the central 
government also reacts to the stock of debt that these regions have when the health care 
financing system is being negotiated. All other variations in the stock of debt do not affect the 
central government’s decision to bail out regions. These results hold equally for discretionary 
and non-discretionary grants and reflect, on the one hand, a non-linear reaction of the central 
government’s distribution of grants to the stock of debt; while, on the other, the distribution of 
non-discretionary grants can only be significantly modified when the financing systems are 
being negotiated. 
 
These results show that the institutional framework regulating intergovernmental relationships 
between the Spanish centre and its regions has the effect of inducing the central government to 
use grants to bail out these communities. As this circumstance can engender expectations among 
the regions of being bailed out and lead to a lack of fiscal discipline, there is an obvious need for 
the system of finance to be reformed. There is, for example, clear indications that the health 
financing system should be reformed, while the distribution criteria applied in the allocation of 
the main non-discretionary grant, PIE, need redefining so as to avoid its being used to bail out 
regions that increase their issue of debt. A further feasible reform option might involve 
increasing the fiscal autonomy of the regions, furnishing them with an efficient regional system 
of taxation that would enable them to adjust their revenue according to their expenditure needs. 
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Appendix: Definition of the variables, descriptive statistics and data source26 
Variable Definition Mean  
(s.d.) 
Source 
Discretionary 
Grantsit 
Discretionary grants per capita (pc) received 
by  region i in period t (2001 €, pc) 
27.993 
(23.877) 
BADESPE 
Non-Discretionary 
Grantsit 
Non-discretionary grants pc received by 
region i in period t (2001 €, pc) 
488.571 
(430.605) 
BADESPE 
Debtit Regional public debt pc of region i in period 
t (2001 €, pc) 
462.828 
(357.881) 
Banc of Spain 
Populationit Population of region i in period t 2460272 
(2076172) 
National 
Institute of 
Statistics (INE) 
Expenditure 
Responsibilitiesit 
Increase in regional expenditures needs due 
to the assignment of the provision of health 
and/or education. 
0.482 
(0.601) 
 
Incomeit Gross domestic product of region i in period 
t (2001 €, pc) 
8527.250 
(1821.418) 
INE 
Unemploymentit Unemployment rate in region i in period t 0.176 
(0.061) 
INE 
Healthit 1 if region i is responsible for providing 
health in period t 
0 otherwise 
0.270 
(0.445) 
 
Population Shareit ∑
i
itit PopulationPopulation  0.067 
(0.0562) 
INE 
Limits on Debtt 1 if t = 1992-2001 
0 if t = 1986-1991 
0.625 
(0.485) 
 
Alignedit 1 if a single party or a party leading a 
coalition at the regional government in i is 
the same party in the central government 
(also a single party o a coalition leader) at 
year t 
0 otherwise 
0.546 
(0.499) 
Ministry of 
Interior (MI) & 
Eleweb 
Pivotalit 1 if a single party or a party leading a 
coalition at the regional government in i is 
the same party as the coalition partner at 
the central government at year t 
0 otherwise 
0.033 
(0.180) 
MI & Eleweb 
Coreit 1 if the party at central government obtained 
more than 40% of the votes in the general 
elections hold previous to t and the 
electoral margin is bigger than 10 
percentual points 
0 otherwise 
0.396 
(0.490) 
MI 
Swingit 1 if the party at the central government 
obtained more than 35% of the votes in the 
general elections hold previous to t and its 
electoral margin is lower than 10 
percentual points 
0 otherwise 
0.296 
(0.457) 
MI 
                                                 
26 1. See footnote Table 1. 2. INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, National Institute of Statistics 
(www.ine.es). 3. Eleweb: Xarxa temàtica en “eleccions, comunicació política i opinió pública”, net on 
elections, political communication and public opinion (www.eleweb.net). 
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Grants 
 
Non-discretionary transfers include PIE (called Fondo de Suficiencia, since 2002), Health Care 
Grant, Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantía), Fund of Inter-territorial Compensation (Fondo de 
Compensación Interterritorial) and expenditure responsibilities assigned to regional 
governments that are not included in PIE.  
 
Discretionary Transfers include transfer to enterprises and families, investment projects 
(convenios y contratos), other conditional transfers, extraordinary compensations and self-
government grants (órganos de autogobierno).  
 
 
Regional Public Debt 
 
Debtit = Initial Debtit + Accumulated Debtit 
 
Initial Debt: Public debt that a region i has when the financing system of year t is negotiated 
Initial Debtit is Debti1986 for t=1987-1991, Debti1991 for t=1992-1996 and Debti1996; for t=1997-
2001 
 
Accumulated Debtit = Debtit - Initial Debtit  
 
For the regions that are responsible for providing health care: 
 
Debtit = Initial Debtit +  
+ Accumulated Debt when negotiating the health care financing systemit + 
+ Accumulated Debt if responsible for healthit 
 
Accumulated Debt when negotiating the health care financing systemit = Debt when negotiating 
the health care financing systemit – Initial Debtit. 
It is only different from zero for those regions that are responsible for providing health care and 
during the years, within a period of the general financing system, after the health care financing 
system has been negotiated. Thus, for the regions that are responsible for providing health care, 
Debt when negotiating the health care financing system is Debti1993  for t=1994-1996, and 
Debti1997  for t=1998-2001. It is 0 otherwise.  
 
Accumulated Debt if responsible for healthit = t1× (Debtit – Initial Debtit) +  
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t2× (Debt when negotiating health care financing systemit – Initial Debtit)  
where t1=1 the years before the health care financing system is negotiated, and 0 otherwise; 
t2=1 the years after the health care financing system is negotiated, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
Expenditure responsibilities 
 
This index is computed as follows: 
 
( ) CEEEdEdEHHIER ititit +=  
 
where Hit and Edit are dummy variables that are equal to one if the region i has been assigned 
the provision of health or education, respectively, in period t; EH=564,67€; EEd=428,05€; 
CE=714,48€ is the average per capita expenditure, at 2001 constant prices, during the period 
1986-2001 on health, education, and on the provision of the public goods and services that are 
assigned to all regions, respectively. Hence, IERit is equal to 0 if the region has not been 
assigned health neither education; is equal to 0,8 (0,6) if it is responsible for providing health 
(education); and, is equal to 1,4 if it is responsible for providing health and education. 
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Table 1 
Financing system of common regions. Average values, €2001 per capita 
 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
    
Other revenues 189.19 230.26 415.17 
Grants 715.17 1025.49 1311.92 
Total non-financial revenues 904.36 1255.75 1727.09 
    
% Discretionary grants 15.45% 15.42% 26.63% 
% Non-discretionary grants 84.55% 84.58% 73.37% 
    
Public debt 2569.76 8185.67 11228.10 
Source: BADESPE and Banco de España. . BADESPE: Base de Datos Económicos 
del Sector Público Español, data base of the Spanish public sector, elaborated by the 
Spanish Institute of Fiscal Studies (www.ife.es). Banco de España: Spanish central 
Banc (www.bde.es). 
 
Table 2 
Existence of regional government bailouts: Discretionary grants 
(1986-2001, 15 regions, within estimator) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
 Existence of bailouts 
Debt (t-1) 0.018 
(2.35)** 
0.018 
(2.42)** 
0.019 
(2.46)*** 
0.019 
(2.45)** 
 Economic controls 
Population(10-6) -4.993 
(-0.40) 
-4.129 
(-0.35) 
-4.018 
(-0.30) 
-1.913 
(-0.14) 
Expenditure Responsibilities 0.283 
(0.03) 
0.331 
(0.03) 
1.849 
(0.204) 
0.201 
(0.02) 
Income (10-3) 5.788 
(1.60) 
6.031 
(1.68)* 
6.173 
(1.60) 
6.077 
(1.66)* 
Unemployment (t-1) -49.862 
(-0.64) 
-34.240 
(-0.40) 
-60.064 
(-0.75) 
-27.127 
(-0.31) 
 Political controls 
Swing 5.499 
(2.53)*** 
5.326 
(2.45)*** 
9.326 
(3.22)*** 
7.923 
(2.81)*** 
Core -5.387 
(-1.16) 
-4.680 
(-0.960) 
0.938 
(0.469) -.- 
Aligned + Pivotal 7.341 
(1.69)* -.- -.- -.- 
Aligned -.- 6.697 (1.60) -.- 
3.850 
(1.65)* 
Pivotal -.- 12.448 (2.03)** 
-.- 11.122 
(1.97)** 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.4676 0.4689 0.4592 0.4666 
F-est (zero sloples) 15.17 
[0.00] 
16.40 
[0.00] 
15.02 
[0.00] 
14.95 
[0.00] 
F-est (zero year) 11.49 
[0.00] 
12.01 
[0.00] 
12.14 
[0.00] 
13.09 
[0.00] 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 2.*,**,*** denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. 3. 
Figures within brackets are p-values. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of regional government bailouts: Discretionary grants 
(1986-2001, 15 regions, within estimator) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
 Determinants of bailouts 
Debt (t-1) 0.015 
(2.27)** 
0.015 
(2.18)** 
0.015 
(2.21)** 
0.016 
(2.75)*** 
×Population Share -0.088 
(-1.40) 
-0.026 
(-0.51) 
-0.069 
(-1.11) -.- 
× Limits on Debt 0.026 
(1.12) 
0.009 
(0.35) 
0.012 
(0.49) -.- 
×Health Care Resp. 0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
0.002 
(0.34) -.- 
× Swing 0.016 
(1.66)* 
0.027 
(2.10)** 
0.021 
(2.10)** 
0.026 
(2.16)** 
×Core -0.024 
(-1.52) -.- 
-0.008 
(-0.56) -.- 
× (Aligned + Pivota)l 0.011 
(1.29) -.- -.- -.- 
×Aligned -.- 0.006 (1.18) 
-.- -.- 
×Pivotal -.- 0.012 (1.21) 
-.- -.- 
 Economic controls 
Population(10-6) 11.221 
(0.67) 
9.361 
(0.57) 
10.319 
(0.77) 
7.920 
(0.54) 
Expenditure Responsibilities 4.078 
(0.47) 
4.235 
(0.45) 
5.105 
(0.55) 
3.649 
(0.38) 
Income (10-3) 9.438 
(2.57)*** 
8.576 
(2.40)*** 
9.209 
(2.57)*** 
8.298 
(2.37)** 
Unemployment (t-1) -27.614 
(-0.37) 
-13.495 
(-0.16) 
-12.953 
(-0.01) 
-20.237 
(-0.23) 
 Political controls 
Swing 7.491 
(2.51)** 
8.421 
(2.66)** 
7.297 
(2.65)** 
7.291 
(2.73)** 
Aligned 3.142 
(1.70)* 
3.561 
(1.73)* 
3.421 
(1.71)* 
3.617 
(1.74)* 
Pivotal 10.941 
(1.99)** 
10.025 
(1.98)** 
10.321 
(1.80)* 
10.605 
(1.82)* 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.4948 0.4990 0.4867 0.4869 
F-est (zero sloples) 15.27 
[0.00] 
14.71 
[0.00] 
14.09 
[0.00] 
16.81 
[0.00] 
F-est (zero year) 12.01 
[0.00] 
12.54 
[0.00] 
13.01 
[0.00] 
12.98 
[0.00] 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 2.*,**,*** denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. 3. 
Figures within brackets are p-values 
34
Table 4 
Existence of regional government bailouts: Non-Discretionary grants 
(1986-2001, 15 regions, Arellano and Bond GMM estimator) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
 Existence of bailouts 
Debt (t-1) 0.079 
(2.41)** 
0.076 
(2.33)** 
0.074 
(2.29)** 
0.077 
(2.35)** 
 Economic controls 
Non-Discretionary Grants  
(t-1) 
0.392 
(9.04)*** 
0.393 
(9.01)*** 
0.398 
(9.24)*** 
0.416 
(9.67)*** 
Population(10-3) -0.298 
(-0.82) 
-0.297 
(-0.81) 
-0.295 
(-0.47) 
-0.284 
(-0.59) 
Expenditure Responsibilities 462.853 
(11.4)*** 
462.134 
(11.7)*** 
460.461 
(11.2)*** 
456.426 
(11.8)*** 
Income 0.011 
(0.68) 
0.011 
(0.69) 
0.012 
(0.74) 
0.010 
(0.64) 
Unemployment (t-1) 95.357 
(0.33) 
75.819 
(0.26) 
72.045 
(0.25) 
97.496 
(0.33) 
 Political controls 
Swing 35.63 
(1.69)* 
35.493 
(1.71)* 
44.623 
(2.10)** 
58.171 
(2.46)** 
Core -56.728 
(-0.96) 
-57.362 
(-0.97) 
-38.355 
(-1.57) -.- 
Aligned + Pivotal 20.343 
(1.30) -.- -.- -.- 
Aligned -.- 20.983 (1.33) -.- 
14.157 
(1.34) 
Pivotal -.- 12.147 (0.37) -.- 
11.216 
(0.35) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
F-est (zero sloples) 21.45 
[0.00] 
23.87 
[0.00] 
22.51 
[0.00] 
23.07 
[0.00] 
F-est (zero year) 17.30 
[0.00] 
17.88 
[0.00] 
18.65 
[0.00] 
17.55 
[0.00] 
Sargan test 1.25 
[0.53] 
1.13 
[0.57] 
1.20 
[0.55] 
1.23 
[0.54] 
AR(1) -4.91 
[0.00] 
-4.97 
[0.00] 
-4.96 
[0.00] 
-4.96 
[0.00] 
AR(2) 1.57 
[0.11] 
1.57 
[0.11] 
1.46 
[0.14] 
1.50 
[0.13] 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 2.*,**,*** denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. 3. 
Figures within brackets are p-values. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of regional government bailouts: Non-Discretionary grants 
(1986-2001, 15 regions, Arellano and Bond GMM estimator) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
 Determinants of bailouts 
Debt(t-1) 0.057 
(2.51)** 
0.051 
(2.49)** 
0.051 
(2.41)** 
0.049 
(2.20)** 
×Population Share 0.088 
(0.21) 
0.124 
(0.31) 
0.301 
(0.71) -.- 
× Limits on Debt 0.123 
(1.97)** 
0.158 
(1.95)** 
0.101 
(1.80)* 
0.165 
(2.00)** 
×Health Care Resp. 0.264 
(3.01)*** 
0.272 
(3.27)*** 
0.217 
(4.06)*** 
0.291 
(6.30)*** 
× Swing 0.113 
(1.90)* 
0.096 
(1.91)* 
0.045 
(1.71)* 
0.087 
(1.67)* 
×Core 0.040 
(0.73) -.- 
0.100 
(0.62) -.- 
× (Aligned+Pivotal) 0.024 
(0.79) -.- -.- -.- 
×Aligned -.- -0.019 (-1.09) -.- -.- 
×Pivotal -.- 0.028 (0.65) -.- -.- 
 Economic controls 
Non-Discretionary Grants  
(t-1) 
0.232 
(4.80)*** 
0.224 
(4.56)*** 
0.251 
(5.19)*** 
0.204 
(4.34)*** 
Population(10-3) -0.389 
(-0.92) 
-0.390 
(-0.95) 
-0.407 
(-0.20) 
-0.376 
(-0.32) 
Expenditure 
Responsibilities 
505.221 
(11.04)*** 
507.35 
(7.80)*** 
511.079 
(8.08)*** 
501.731 
(7.82)*** 
Income -0.010 
(-0.64) 
-0.011 
(-0.66) 
-0.006 
(-0.39) 
-0.012 
(-0.79) 
Unemployment (t-1) 94.83 
(1.12) 
95.832 
(1.06) 
95.10 
(0.99) 
93.270 
(0.41) 
 Political controls 
Swing 54.236 
(2.90)*** 
47.561 
(2.99)*** 
46.708 
(2.93)*** 
54.894 
(2.95)*** 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
F-est (zero sloples) 25.00 
[0.00] 
25.31 
[0.00] 
25.74 
[0.00] 
26.92 
[0.00] 
F-est (zero year) 18.42 
[0.00] 
17.98 
[0.00] 
17.61 
[0.00] 
17.02 
[0.00] 
Sargan test 1.22 
[0.54] 
1.31 
[0.52] 
1.28 
[0.53] 
1.27 
[0.53] 
AR(1) -6.64 
[0.00] 
-6.66 
[0.00] 
-7.02 
[0.00] 
-6.82 
[0.00] 
AR(2) -0.19 
[0.85] 
0.67 
[0.51] 
-0.31 
[0.75] 
-0.61 
[0.54] 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 2.*,**,*** denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. 3. 
Figures within brackets are p-values. 
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Table 6 
Bailout-grants: importance of the regional public debt 
(1986-2001, 15 regions) 
 Discretionary Grants Non-Discretionary grants 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
 Existence of bailouts 
Initial Debt when negotiating 
General Financing System (F.S) 
0.023 
(3.11)*** 
0.023 
(3.56)*** 
0.103 
(2.78)*** 
0.096 
(2.62)*** 
Accumulated Debt 0.014 
(1.36) -.- 
0.059 
(1.51) -.- 
Accumulated Debt when 
negotiating Health F.S. -.- 
0.024 
(1.65)* -.- 
0.068 
(1.70)* 
Accumulated Debt if 
Responsible of Health -.- 
-0.015 
(-1.33) -.- 
0.045 
(0.75) 
Accumulated Debt if not 
Responsible of Health -.- 
0.025 
(1.25) -.- 
-0.064 
(-0.36) 
 Economic controls 
Non-Discretionary Grants  
(t-1) -.- -.- 
0.425 
(9.97)*** 
0.378 
(8.91)*** 
Population(10-3) -1.6·10-3 
(-0.12) 
-2.6·10-3 
(-0.19) 
-0.281 
(-0.58) 
-0.312 
(-0.97) 
Expenditure Responsibilities 1.190 
(0.12) 
4.628 
(0.50) 
463.224 
(10.62)*** 
495.296 
(10.90)*** 
Income (10-3) 6.207 
(1.66)* 
5.767 
(1.65)* 
9.710 
(0.60) 
4.192 
(0.26) 
Unemployment (t-1) -24.894 
(-0.29) 
-26.918 
(-0.32) 
76.846 
(0.62) 
97.320 
(1.03) 
 Political controls 
Swing 8.034 
(3.07)*** 
7.954 
(2.91)*** 
56.574 
(3.39)*** 
53.339 
(2.71)*** 
Aligned 4.047 
(1.66)* 
4.254 
(1.67)* -.- -.- 
Pivotal 11.141 
(1.91)*** 
11.037 
(1.92)*** -.- -.- 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.4668 0.4824 0.4592 0.4666 
Sargan test -.- -.- 1.29 [0.52] 
1.27 
[0.53] 
F-est (zero sloples) 14.25 
[0.00] 
15.97 
[0.00] 
22.14 
[0.00] 
24.05 
[0.00] 
F-est (zero year) 13.89 
[0.00] 
13.92 
[0.00] 
19.88 
[0.00] 
19.96 
[0.00] 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 2.*,**,*** denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. 3. 
Figures within brackets are p-values. 4. Columns [1] & [3] report the results of estimating equation [8] 
decomposing Debt in Initial Debt when negotiating General Financing System (F.S) + Accumulated 
Debt. 5 Columns [5] & [4] report the results of estimating equation [8] decomposing Debt, for the regions 
responsible for providing health care, in Initial Debt when negotiating General Financing System (F.S) + 
Accumulated Debt when negotiating Health F.S. + Accumulated Debt if Responsible of Health; for the 
regions not responsible for providing health care Debt is decomposed in Initial Debt when negotiating 
General Financing System (F.S) + Accumulated Debt if not Responsible of Health. 
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